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I. INTRODUCTION
Responsibility is a double-edged sword. When an individual is
considered responsible for a certain decision or action, we think it proper
that he or she bear the burden of any negative consequences. When that
decision leads to a criminal act, punishment is fully deserved. In this context,

I Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham University 1973; J.D. New
York University School of Law 1976; L.L.M. Temple University School of Law, 1983.
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responsibility is roughly synonymous with blame.
Yet, responsibility is also used in a positive sense, to denote sufficient
capacity to be trusted to make decisions and act autonomously. A person
might claim to be responsible as a justification for being given the right to
make some decision or take some action. For example, an adolescent might
claim to be sufficiently responsible to be trusted with the family car or with
babysitting duties.
These two aspects of responsibility are connected. The claim of
responsibility in the positive sense leads to the individual being given
decision-making power. When that power leads to negative consequences,
blame, and perhaps punishment, is then fully deserved. On the other hand,
one may avoid blame and punishment by establishing a lack of responsibility,
perhaps owing to a deficient capacity to act or decide. For many years, the
law has wrestled with questions concerning responsibility, capacity, blame,
and punishment on a range of issues concerning minors, especially
adolescents.
If law and social science could neatly divide people into two distinct
categories, adults and children, there would be little difficulty in designing
appropriate rules. An adult would be fblly responsible in both senses of the
word, both entitled to make autonomous choices and rightfully blamed and
punished for choices and acts harmful to society. A child would be denied
such autonomy, but also largely absolved from the same degree of blame
and punishment meted out to an adult.
However, for some time now, modem American society has recognized
that there is no sharp child-adult dichotomy. Instead a transitional period,
known as adolescence, has attracted increasing attention,' especially as
more young people extend their student years beyond high school, delay
marriage, and perhaps even live with parents into their twenties. 2 These
trends, and the recognition of their significance, pose difficulty to a legal
system that prefers clear categorical rules. Can we simply set an age,
whether it be eighteen, twenty-one, or any other number of years, as the
point at which responsibility automatically falls on an individual? Recently,
1. See JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO
THE PRESENT 217-273 (1977); LOUISE J KAPLAN, ADOLESCENCE: THE FAREWELL TO

CHILDHOOD 52-81 (1984); See generally THOMAS HINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
AMERICAN TEENAGER (1999).

2. See generally SUSAN LITTWIN, THE POSTPONED GENERATION: WHY AMERICAN
YOUTH ARE GROWING UP LATER (1986).
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the question of adolescent responsibility has been posed in two legal areas.
The first question involves criminal law, specifically, the question of whether
adolescent criminals should be subject to the same types and degrees of
punishment as adult offenders. The juvenile justice system that arose in the

early twentieth century rejected the earlier approach of presenting only the
two alternatives of no culpability and full adult responsibility when dealing
with adolescents.' Instead, the alternative of a less harsh, more
rehabilitation-oriented regime was introduced." Recently, however, a sharp
rise in the public perception of dangerous adolescent crime led many states
to change course and subject juvenile offenders to full adult criminal

penalties.'
The second question of adolescent responsibility posed involves the right
of non-delinquent adolescents to make a range of autonomous choices and
to exercise a range of rights denied to minors. While this question included
such diverse issues as the extent of first amendment rights held by high
school students6 and the acceptable minimum drinking age,7 perhaps the
sharpest disputes arose concerning adolescent choices involving

3. See Margaret May, Innocence and Experience: The Evolution of the Concept of
Juvenile Delinquency in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: DELINQUENCY AND DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR 46, 47-48 (Eric H.
Monkkonen ed., 1991) [hereinafter CRIME AND JUSTICE].
4. See Robert M. Mennel, Attitudes and Policies toward Juvenile Delinquency in the
United States: A HistoriographicalReview, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 8593. Douglas Rendleman sees the advent of the juvenile justice system as a piece of a larger
package of "child-saving" reform during the Progressive era, see Douglas R. Rendleman,
Parents Patriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra
note 3, at 119-73.
5. SeeMarygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375,
390-95.
6. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that
school officials may regulate the content of a school sponsored newspaper); Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that student may be disciplined for "lewd
speech" at a high school assembly).
7. The federal government, through the threat of withholding 5% of the federal highway
funds due to the states, put pressure on the states to uniformly adopt a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the
conditional spending provision).
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reproductive rights,' abortion,9 and other health care issues."° While these
issues were not decided by legislatures and courts in a uniform manner, it
is generally true that the last decades of the twentieth century saw a greater
level of respect in the legal system for the right of autonomy for
adolescents," especially in controversial health care matters involving
reproductive issues. 2
In setting a degree of punishment, legal systems take into account not
merely the act committed, but also the extent to which the actor is
responsible for his actions. While deterrence is, without a doubt, an
important goal of criminal law, to some degree retribution is always present
as well. 3 It is hard to defend the position of seeking retribution against one
who, because of mental defect or age, is not fairly seen as responsible for
his choices. 4 To insist upon full adult penalties for adolescent offenders is
to take the position, at least implicitly, that an adolescent is filly responsible
for his criminal choices and that his age does not lessen that responsibility.
Similarly, in deciding whether to extend a right of autonomy to
adolescents, the legal system evaluates adolescents' capacity to exercise
those rights in a responsible manner. To justify extending the right of
autonomy to adolescents one must conclude that they have approximately
8. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down a New
York statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors under age sixteen).
9. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (reaffirming that a state may require
parental consent or notification only if an alternative judicial procedure allows a mature
minor to bypass the requirement). AccordPlanned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
10. See In re E.G., 549 N.E. 2d 322 (I11.1989) (holding that a mature minor has an
autonomy right to refuse medically necessary treatment); see also Jennifer L. Rosato, The
Ultimate Test ofAutonomy: Should MinorsHave a Right to MakeDecisionsRegardingLifeSustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1996).
11. See, Bruce C. Hafen, Children'sLiberation and The New Egalitarianism;Some
ReservationsAbout Abandoning Youth to their 'Rights,' 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605,630-644.
12. See Carey, 431 U.S. 678; Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622. See also WilliamAdams, "ButDo
You Have to Tell My Parents?" The Dilemma for Minors Seeking HIV-Testing and
Treatment, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 493 (1994).
13. For an overview of the history of retribution, and the philosophy supporting its
legitimacy, see MARvIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION (1990).
14. "Attribution of responsibility to a person for inadequate performance of a social
task becomes meaningless if performance was impossible due to circumstances beyond that
person's control." EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1980).
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the same capacity to exercise that right as adults.
In light of this conclusion, one might expect two positions on adolescent
autonomy to emerge, with one side taking the position that adolescents as
a group are sufficiently indistinguishable from adults in their capacity to
make important decisions and the other side taking the opposite view. One
would expect the former group to advocate assigning full adult penalties to
adolescent criminal offenders and extending adult autonomy rights to
adolescents in cases involving reproductive rights and other health care
issues. The latter group, skeptical of adolescent decisionmaking, would
advocate a separate, more lenient treatment of juvenile offenders and a
denial of the right of autonomy, for fear that those rights would be exercised
irresponsibly by adolescents.
While there are, without doubt, some who hold to each of these
positions, it should be immediately evident that many people in today's
political arena do not. The "liberal" position would extend autonomy rights
but limit criminal penalties for adolescents. The "conservative" position
would insist on full adult punishments, yet deny full autonomy rights. On the
surface, each of these positions creates a dissonance. In one context, an
adolescent is viewed as a fully responsible decision-maker, in the other
context, his capacity and responsibility is disparaged.
Several years ago I published an article commenting on these
developments, and particularly focusing on an apparent, and serious,
inconsistency in the positions of both the typical liberal and the typical
conservative toward them.15 In this earlier article I pointed out this
dissonance and suggested that much further thought, both by social
scientists and those in the legal system, might be required either to resolve
the dissonance, or to explain why the surface dissonance is deceptive. The
U. S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Roper v. Simmons,16 invalidating
the imposition of the death penalty for a murder committed by one under
age eighteen,17 allowed the Justices to weigh in on the question of
adolescent responsibility. It also provides an opportunity to examine how far,
if at all, legal thought and other disciplines have come in recent years to
resolving this question.
15. DonaldL. Beschle, The JuvenileJusticeCounterrevolution:Respondingto Cognitive
Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-MakingCapacity ofMinors, 48 EMORY L.J.
65 (1999).
16. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
17. Id. at 556.
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This article begins with an analysis of Simmons and the various opinions
of the Justices. It also looks at those the same Justices' positions on
adolescent choice in non-criminal contexts, particularly the controversial and
recurring issue of the imposition of a parental notification requirement on
adolescents seeking to have an abortion. The next section reviews some
recent social science and biological research on adolescent decision-making.
The final section of the Article makes some suggestions on how the legal
system's apparent dissonance on the question of adolescent decisionmaking might be resolved.
II. ROPER V. SIMMONS: INVALIDATING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
ADOLESCENT MURDERERS

In Simmons,'" the U. S. Supreme Court revisited the question of
whether the death penalty is constitutionally permissible as punishment for
first-degree murder committed when the defendant was a minor." In 1989,
the Court held, in Stanford v. Kentucky,2 ° that the Fifth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did not bar execution of killers
who were over age fifteen at the time of their crime, but would bar the
execution of any younger offender.2
Since the Court overturned its ruling that the death penalty itself was
constitutionally suspect 2 and gave states the power to impose capital
punishment within constitutional boundaries,23 those boundaries have

18. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551.
19. Simmons was a seventeen-year-old high school juniorwhenhe planned and executed
a brutal murder, apparently for the thrill of it. Id. at 556-57.
20. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
21. Id. at 380. Stanford,upholdingthe constitutionality of the deathpenalty as applied
to a juvenile murderer of age sixteen or seventeen, came one year after Thomson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), invalidatinga death sentence of ajuvenile who was fifteen
at the time he committed murder. The Court in Thomson, by plurality opinion, concluded
that the execution of anyone who was under age sixteen at the time of the offense violated
the Eighth Amendment. Thomson, 487 U.S. at 838.
22. Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating the death penalty statutes
then in force in thirty-nine states, on the grounds that those statutes permitted the penalty
to be imposed in an arbitrary and nearly random manner. The five tofour decision left open
the question ofwhether, properly administered, capital punishment might be constitutional).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), addressed the question left open in
Furman, and held that capital punishment was constitutionally permissible under a system
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generally attempted to insure that only the most clearly blameworthy
criminals are executed. Thus, the Court has indicated that the death penalty
may not be imposed for any crime other than homicide24 and that a
mandatory death penalty, even for first-degree murder, cannot be
sustained.25 Rather, the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case
must be considered.2 6 While declaring a broad category of felons subject as
a group to the death penalty is clearly impermissible, declaring a category
of killers ineligible as a group, however, might be warranted.
In the years following Stanford, a number of states chose to prohibit
the execution of defendants who had killed before reaching eighteen 7 and
the international consensus against such punishments solidified.28 The
Supreme Court itself reconsidered the Eighth Amendment's "evolving
standards of decency" in another context.2 9 In Atkins v. Virginia,3" the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of a mentally
retarded defendant.3 On the same day the Court decided Stanford in 1989,

"that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance" in
determining which offenders deserve such punishment. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. In other
words, consideration must be given to specific aggravating or mitigating factors about the

crime or the offender. Id.
24. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 597-98 (1977) (holding that "[s]hort of
homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self,"' but nevertheless held that capital
punishment was "an excessive penalty for the rapist who ...does not take human life.").
25. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 n.7 (1976) (invalidating a statute
providing for a mandatory death penalty, although the Court left open the question of
whether such a statute could be upheld for "an extremely narrow category of homicide, such
as murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence). Seefurther, Sumner v. Sherman, 483 U.S.
66, 77-78 (1987) (holding that an individualized inquiry was required even in such a narrow
category of cases).
26. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05.
27. At the time of the Court's decision in Stanford, twenty-five states authorized the
death penalty for seventeen-year-old offenders, and twenty-two states authorized it for
sixteen-year-old offenders, Simmons, 543 U.S. at 562-63. In the fifteen years after Stanford,
five states that had permitted the execution ofjuvenile offenders prohibited such use of the
death penalty. Id. at 565.
28. See id. at 574-78 (noting "the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile deathpenalty").
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
30. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
31. Id. at 321. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens begins his opinion by noting:
[t]hose mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal
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it rejected the claim that the mentally retarded, as a group, were ineligible
for capital punishment.3 2 The Court's reversal in Atkins, along with
developments at the state and international levels, made it unsurprising, if
not inevitable, that the Court would revisit the issue of the permissibility of
execution of teenage offenders. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in
Simmons, penned three distinct lines of argument to establish that Stanford
should be overruled and replaced with a constitutional prohibition on the
execution of offenders whose crimes occurred prior to their eighteenth
birthday.

33

Kennedy's first point is directed at the concept of "evolving standards"
under the Eighth Amendment.3 4 The post-Stanford trend of states rejecting
the execution of offenders under age eighteen establishes, according to
Justice Kennedy, the emergence of a national consensus that such use of
capital punishment is cruel and unusual.35 Justice Scalia and the other
dissenting Justices took issue with Justice Kennedy, both on the question of
when a trend can be said to represent a national consensus 36 and also the
broader question of whether judicial perception of such a consensus should
determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment. 37 The extent to which
responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because
of their disabilities in the areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct...
Id. at 306.
32. Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled byAtkins, supra note 30.
33. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 1192-2000. Also note that two of these lines of argument,
while both of interest and significance not only on this issue, but on a wider range of
constitutional questions, do not relate to the subject matter of this article and are therefore
not discussed.

34. Id., 543 U.S. at 563-69.
35. Justice Kennedy added the twelve states that reject the death penalty entirely to
the eighteen states [that allow the death penalty] but bar its application tojuvenile offenders
to find that a total of thirty states have rejected the death penalty for those under age
eighteen. Id. at 563. He also notes that only a handful of the twenty states that permit the
execution of juvenile offenders have actually imposed the penalty to a juvenile offender in
the years since Stanford.Id.
36. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 607-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that considering
states that have no death penalty as part of the calculation is inappropriate and that the
more pertinent inquiry is how many states treat sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders
as eligible for full adult penalties).
37. Id. at 1217.
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courts should lead in defining constitutionally unacceptable behavior or defer
to other branches of government is, of course, a perennial issue.38
A somewhat more contemporary issue is raised by Justice Kennedy's
second line of argument. In support of his conclusion that evolving standards
of decency demand invalidation of the death penalty for juvenile offenders,
he points to the law of other nations and articulated international standards
that clearly reject such punishment.39 In response, Justice Scalia repeats his
contention, clearly voiced in other cases," that foreign or international legal
sources have no place in the interpretation or application of the United
States Constitution.1
These points of dispute between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia are
significant and will no doubt be the subject of a considerable amount of
commentary. Yet, this article focuses on the third line of argument
employed by Justice Kennedy. The Court has made it clear that the death
penalty must be reserved for those who not only commit the most
objectively offensive forms of homicide, but who also can be seen as
bearing a particularly high degree of culpability. 42 Can it be said that
adolescents as a group, by reason of lack of full maturity, fall short of the
necessary degree of personal responsibility required to justify capital
punishment?
Justice Kennedy concluded that, indeed, "[t]he differences between
juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability." 3 This conclusion was supported by studies demonstrating that
adolescents, as a group, exhibit less maturity and greater irresponsibility than
adults44 while at the same time having character traits that are less fixed
38. On the role of the courts, legislatures, and public opinion in effectingserious social
change, see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).

39. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574-578.
40. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Justice Scalia states for the
Court, "we think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution." Id. at 921 n. 11.
41. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 621-28.
42. "Becausethe deathpenalty is the most severe punishment, the EighthAmendment
applies to itwith special force ....Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability
makes them 'the most deservingof execution,"' Id. at 568, quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 569-76. See also infra, notes 117-147, and accompanying text.
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and, therefore, more open to correction.45 Justice Kennedy pointed out that
the difference between adult and adolescent levels of maturity were
seemingly evident to lawmakers in every state, who have for decades
enforced a significant number of limitations on the activity of those under
age eighteen, placing such things as voting rights, jury service, and marriage
46
without parental consent off limits.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia took issue with this contention on several
grounds. First, he noted that a number of studies existed that concluded,
contrary to those relied on by Justice Kennedy, that the decision-making
capacity of older adolescents was essentially similar to that of adults.47
While conceding the validity of the studies cited by Justice Kennedy, Justice
Scalia argued that the conclusion that the average adolescent, or the
majority of adolescents, have insufficient decision making capacity says

nothing about the capacity of a particular juvenile offender. 4 The penalty
phase of a capital case could be used to determine maturity levels in any
individual case, making a blanket rule unnecessary and overbroad.49
In addition, while states clearly restrict adolescent behavior in a
significant number of ways that indicate skepticism of teenage maturity
levels, Justice Scalia notes that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has not
only accepted, but also insisted upon, a degree of respect for adolescent
decision-making. 0 Specifically, Justice Scalia contrasts the Court's
45. Id. at 570 ( "[firom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed.").
46. Id. at 569. As appendices to the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy attaches the list
of states' minimum age to vote. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 581, Appendix B. Also attached is
the states' minimum age for jury service and state statutes setting the minimum age for
marriage without parental consent. Id. at 583-85. Appendix C, D. However, perhaps the
most exhaustive compilation of state age requirements for various activities, ranging
alphabetically from abortion to wills, can be found at the website of the Juvenile Law
Center. The Juvenile Law Center, available at www.jlc.org/agerequirements (last visited,
Apr. 3, 2006).
47. Simmons. 543 U.S. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra notes 87-114, and
accompanying text.
48. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617-618 ("At most, those studies conclude that, on average
or in most cases, persons under eighteen are unable to take moral responsibility for their
actions. Not one of the cited studies opines that all individuals under eighteen are unable to
appreciate the nature of their crimes.").
49. Id. at 617-20.
50. Simmon at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 52 Wayne L. Rev. 10 2006

2006]

ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE

11

interpretation of adolescent decision-making capacity in Simmons with the
view implicit in its 1990 decision of Hodgson v. Minnesota."
In Hodgson, the Court held that a state statute that requires parental
notification prior to the performance of an abortion on a minor was valid
only if the statute provided a judicial bypass option that allowed the minor
to establish that she was sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision
on her own.5" The decision in Hodgson, and earlier cases involving parental
consent and notification statutes, 53 were supported by social science
findings that concluded that adolescents generally have the ability to make
significant life decisions in a competent manner.' To Justice Scalia, this
exposes a jarring inconsistency in the Court's position. If adolescents are
sufficiently responsible to make decisions about matters as significant as
abortion and reproduction, doesn't it follow that they are sufficiently
responsible to bear the full consequences of a decision to commit serious
crime?
Of course, Justice Scalia's claim that the majority's reasoning is
inconsistent can be easily turned on him as well. As a dissenter both in
Simmons and Hodgson, Justice Scalia inconsistently finds that juvenile
offenders are sufficiently mature to bear full responsibility for their criminal
acts, while also arguing pregnant adolescents as insufficiently mature to
choose an abortion without involving their parents in the decision. 6
51. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
52. Id. at 497 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The key vote was provided by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 458-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part). Four justices would have invalidated Minnesota's two-parent notice requirement
even with a judicial bypass option. Id. at 455-58 (Stevens, J.); id. at 461-79 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Four justices
would have upheld the requirement even without such an option. Id. at 488-97 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
53. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding
parental consent statute when accompaniedby judicial bypass option); Bellottiv. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979).
54. Justice Scalia notes that in its amicus brief inHodgson, the American Psychological
Association, "which [in Simmons] claims ... that scientific evidence shows persons under
eighteen lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions," attested to have
found "'arich body of research' showing that juveniles are mature enough todecide whether
to obtain an abortion without parental involvement," Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Thus, in the context of abortion, Justice Scalia joins Justice Kennedy's opinion
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Valid or not, Justice Scalia's criticism brings to the surface a significant
issue. Does consistency demand that a legal system that respects an
adolescent's right to make significant life choices also hold an adolescent
fully responsible for the negative consequences of those choices, justifying
severe criminal punishment? Does a legal system that mitigates criminal
punishment for juvenile offenders, to maintain consistency, need to deny
those adolescents the right to exercise full autonomy?
Before examining the social and biological science findings on the
question of adolescent decision-making competence, it is useful to take a
brief look at whether the justices who have addressed the question have, in
fact, been acting inconsistently. Actually, the apparent inconsistency of the
Court in Simmons and Hodgson may be the result of Justices acting
consistently with several different principles, rather than making inconsistent
result-oriented decisions. The apparent inconsistency of the Court masks at
least four different types of consistency in the thinking of four Justices.
A. Justice Kennedy
While Justice Scalia's criticism of the inconsistency of the Court in its
decisions of Simmons and Hodgson might be valid, there is no
inconsistency in Justice Kennedy's views. Justice Kennedy is not one of the
Court's staunch opponents of the recognition of an abortion right, rather he
was one of the three co-authors of the crucial joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey57 which reaffirmed

the basic right established by Roe v. Wade. 8
However, Justice Kennedy has also supported state efforts to regulate
the abortion right at its margins, including requirements for parental
notification in cases involving minors. 9 Thus, his support of Minnesota's
parental notification requirement in Hodgson' is entirely consistent with his
stating "[a]ge is a rough but fair approximate of maturity and judgment," Hodgson, 457 U.S.
at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. In defending Minnesota's two-parent notification statute in Hodgson, Justice
Kennedy notes, "[a]ge is a rough but fair approximation of maturity and judgment".
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). See also Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), upholding Ohio's parental notification statute.
60. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 483.

HeinOnline -- 52 Wayne L. Rev. 12 2006

2006]

ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE

13

opposition to the death penalty for juvenile offenders in Simmons. In each
case, his opinion implicitly or explicitly takes the position that adolescent
decision-making is suspect to an extent that will justify categorical
limitations on the respect that government owes to that decision and its
consequences.
B. Justice O'Connor
In her separate dissent in Simmons, Justice O'Connor agrees with the
majority "that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible,
and less fully formed than adults, and that these differences bear on
juveniles' comparative moral culpability."'" She disagrees, however, with
the conclusion that these differences are sufficient to warrant a categorical
rule barring the imposition of the death penalty on adolescent offenders."
Instead, she sees a case-by-case analysis of each offender's level of
culpability as sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.63 Such a case-bycase inquiry will presumably make the execution of juvenile offenders a rare
event, but will leave the door open for individual exceptions.'
In Hodgson, Justice O'Connor took an analogous approach on the
6
issue of parental involvement in a minor's decision to obtain an abortion. 1
She provided a decisive vote in maintaining that a parental notification
requirement is permissible, but only if the state provides the pregnant
adolescent the option of seeking judicial approval to forego notification or
consent. 66 Such approval is granted where the court finds that either the
adolescent is mature enough to make the decision by herself, or that
regardless of the maturity level of the adolescent, proceeding with the
abortion without parental involvement would be in the best interests of the

61. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 599 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 598-602.
63. Id.
64. "I would not be so quick to conclude that the constitutional safeguards, the
sentencing juries, and the trial judges upon which we place so much reliance in all capital
cases are inadequate in this narrow context." Id. at 603-604.
65.497 U.S. at 458-61 (O'Connor, J., concurringin part and concurring in the judgment
in part).
66. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 468-70 (O'Connor J.,
dissenting), discussing the judicial bypass option for mature minors faced with parental
notification or consent requirements.
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minor. 1
Justice O'Connor's consistency is her rejection in each case of
categorical rules regarding adolescent decision-making capacity, in favor of
a position requiring case-by-case consideration of the issue. Such a position
eliminates any need to decide whether adolescent decision-making is always
sufficiently similar to adult decision-making for the law to regard them as
equally deserving of respect. Justice O'Connor was the recent Court's most
consistent advocate of case-by-case balancing approaches to a variety of
constitutional issues. 6' Her rejection of categorical rules here should come
as no surprise.
C. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia charges the Simmons majority with inconsistency on the
question of adolescent decision-making in light of its earlier position in
Hodgson.69 But on the surface, Justice Scalia can be charged with the
same degree of inconsistency. While he would support states in their
attempts to limit adolescent decision-making regarding abortion in cases
such as Hodgson," he would allow states to hold adolescent offenders fully
responsible for their criminal choices, even to the point of imposing capital
punishment.
However, this apparent inconsistency is necessary in order to permit
Justice Scalia to adhere to his own brand of consistency; when text, history,
or precedent place no clear limitations on state authority to regulate or
punish conduct, deference to legislative judgment is required, even if those
judgments might not be entirely consistent with each other. The position of
Justice Scalia (and Chief Justice Rehnquist) in Hodgson can also be
67. See generally Sue Ganske Graziano, ParentalNotification and a Minor's Right to

an Abortion After Hodgson &Akron II, 170 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 581 (1991); Abortion-Parental NotificationStatutes, 104 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1990).
68. See NANCYM AVEETY, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME

COURT (1996). Professor Maveety describes Justice O'Connor as a "jurisprudential
accomodationist," who uses "flexible, contextual, and fact specific" approaches to balance
interests. Id.at 3. For abroader look at the 'minimalist' approaches of Justice O'Connor and
some of her colleagues, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).

69. See supra,notes 50-55.
70. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Id. at 480-501 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and
Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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explained by their fundamental disagreement with Roe's recognition of a
due process right to abortion.7 Yet, in a broader sense, what holds the
dissents in both Hodgson and Simmons together is the support of deference
to legislative judgments.
D. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens presents the reverse image of Justice Scalia on these
issues. In joining the majority of the court both in prohibiting the execution
of juvenile offenders and in supporting the right of adolescents to exercise
the abortion right without necessarily involving their parents in the
decision,72 his positions are on the surface inconsistent, but with conclusions
opposite those of Justice Scalia. In addition, Justice Stevens' willingness to
override legislative judgments in each case stands in opposition to the
deference of Justice Scalia.
The consistency in Justice Stevens' positions would appear to be a
desire to protect adolescents from state-imposed negative consequences of
their actions, at least consequences that are unduly harsh. Where a decision
to commit homicide would otherwise lead to the imposition of the most
severe and irreversible punishment, the youth of the offender should serve
to mitigate responsibility and, therefore, the harshness of the state's
response." Where the practical effect of the state's action would be to
require an adolescent to assume the role of teenage mother against her
wishes, her decision to avoid that fate is to be respected.7 4 Although
abortion opponents can be expected to contest the conclusion that childbirth
is a worse alternative than abortion, Justice Stevens seems to be acting
71. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), where Justice Scalia states his view that Roe should be explicitly overruled.
72. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 45558 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
73. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74.
[T]he right to make this decision 'do[es] not mature and come into being
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.' Thus, the
constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into the
process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant
minors as well as adult women.
Hodgson, 457 U.S. at 434-35, quotingPlanned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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consistently in both Hodgson and Simmons to protect adolescents from
what he sees as the excessive use of state power.
These four Justices show that it is possible to take positions that are, on
their face, inconsistent on the issue of how much respect is due to decisions
made by adolescents, yet are nonetheless required in order to maintain
consistency toward another principle. Still, to the extent that courts and
legislatures will continue to frame rules and statutes based upon
assumptions regarding adolescent decision-making competence, the question
remains, to what extent is that competence equivalent to that of an adult?
Can we make reliable general conclusions? Will the answer vary depending
on the type of adolescent or the context of the decision? Before answering
these questions, it will be necessary to review the most recent findings of
social and biological science on these issues.
III. ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY: EVIDENCE FROM
SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE

For more than a century, American law has regarded adolescents as
less capable of making important decisions than adults and, therefore, has
acted both to limit their capacity to make decisions, and shield them from at
least some of the consequences. Classic examples include limitations on a
minor's capacity to commit to a binding contract,75 child labor laws,76 and
minimum ages for marriage without parental consent.77

But this has not been a uniform trend, especially in recent decades.
Longstanding minimum age requirements for such things as the purchase
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 7-3-305(a)(1) (West 1975) (allowing infancy as a defense
in contract action); ALA. CODE § 26-1-1 (defining the age of majority as nineteen); CAL.
COM. CODE § 3305(a)(1) (West Ann. 2006) (allowing infancy as a defense in contract
action); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6710 (West Ann. 2006) (allowing a minor to disaffirm a
contract); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §42a-3-305 (a)(1) (West Ann. 2006) (allowing infancy
as defensein contract action); and §1-ld (West Ann. 2006) (defining infant as aperson under
age eighteen).
76. See Selected State ChildLabor StandardsAffecting Minors Under 18 in Non-farm
Employment, a compilation of state restrictions on child labor at the website of the U.S.
Dept. ofLaboravailableathttp://www.dol.gov/esa/p rograms/whd/state/nonfarm.htm(2004)
(last visited, Apr. 1, 2006).
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.0405 (West Ann. 2006); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 7 (McKinney 1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1304 (prohibiting marriage without parental
consent for minors under eighteen).
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of alcohol"8 or cigarettes,79 gambling," and the possession of firearms8
have been joined by such concerns as limiting adolescent ability to obtain
tattoos,82 body piercing,83 or even artificial tanning84 without parental
consent. But this has been accompanied by a clear legislative trend in
response to public pressure to create tougher penalties for juvenile crime,
with more juvenile offenders being dealt with in the adult system.85 Also
courts and legislatures have carved out areas of health care decisions, most
notably reproduction and abortion, where at least some adolescent decisions
are entitled to respect.86
Simmons weighs in on the side of skepticism toward adolescent
decision-making capacity. It is unclear, however, whether this will be just
78. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (2005) (prohibiting purchase or sale of alcohol
to anyone under age twenty-one). Accord 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-16 (2006); MINN.
STAT. § 340 A. 503 (2004).
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Ann. 2006) (barring the purchase of
cigarettes by anyone under age eighteen); accordGA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-171 (2005);
MICa COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.641-.642 (West Ann. 2006).
80. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1610 (McKinney 2006) (prohibiting persons under the
age of eighteen from purchasing lottery tickets); 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/2 (2006)
(prohibiting persons under the age of eighteen from participating in bingo); 4 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 325.228 (barring persons under the age ofeighteen from placing pari-mutuel
bets) (1995).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.16 (McKinney 2006) (prohibiting sale delivery
of certain firearms to anyone under age nineteen); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-34 (West
Ann. 2006) (restricting sale or delivery of certain firearms to anyone under age twenty-one);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 §903 (2006).
82. See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE §653 (West Ann. 2006) (prohibiting youth under age
eighteen from obtaining a tattoo without parental consent); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-71
(2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2246 (West 2006).
83. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-92g(West Ann. 2006) (prohibiting body
piercing of persons under age eighteen without parental consent); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1210.1 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.3 (Michie 2006).
84. See, e.g., CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §22706 (West Ann. 2006) (prohibitingpersons
under the age of eighteen from using artificial tanning devices without parental consent);
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §333.13407 (West Ann. 2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

ANN. §145.008 (Vernon 2006). For an exhaustive compilation of statutes imposing age
requirements on a wide range of activities see the Juvenile Law Center available at
www.jlc.org/agerequirements(last visited, Apr. 1, 2006).
85. See Melli, supra note 5.
86. See generallyWalter Wadlington, Medical Decision-MakingFor andBy Children:
Tensions Between Parent,State and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311.
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another piece of an inconsistent picture, or whether Simmons will push the
law toward a more consistent position. If the latter, we might find that apart
from the death penalty, the full imposition of adult penalties for juvenile
offenders becomes suspect. But if that is the case, will that simultaneously
lead to less respect for adolescent decision-making in other areas, such as
reproduction and other health care choices?
What do social science and biological science tell us about adolescent
decision-making? Do they support the Simmons view of impaired
competence, or the implicit view of Hodgson respecting adolescent
decision-making? Have the findings themselves been consistent?
A. Early Social Science Studies
Much of the early social science work on adolescent decision-making
capacity came at a time when this question involved medical, and
particularly reproductive, choices. 7 At the outset, any study of decisionmaking capacity must face the question of how to evaluate decision-making
competence. A study that evaluates decisions on the basis of whether the
correct choice was made is problematic in any context in which legitimate
differences of opinion might arise as to which choice was correct. In light
of this, early studies generally worked from the premise that decisionmaking capacity would be evaluated through tests of cognitive abilities of
the decision-maker.88 Cognitive abilities include the ability to understand
information, such as the potential consequences of certain acts and the
likelihood of such consequences, and the ability to process that information
to a conclusion.89 If these types of competencies are present, then the fact
87. Elizabeth Scott and her colleagues wondered whether researchers' support of the
reproductive rights of adolescents may have led them, consciously or not,to exaggeratethe
strengthof their findings of adolescent decision makingcompetence. Elizabeth S. Scott et al.,
EvaluatingAdolescent DecisionMaking in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221,
224, n.2 (1995).
88. Id. at 223-24. This "informed consent" test was used in these studies "as a general
proxy of competence in evaluating adolescent decision making." Id.
89.
Although the emphasis varies depending on the test, modem constructs
focus on the following elements: an understanding of relevant disclosed
information ... an ability to appreciate its relevance to one's own
situation . . . and an ability to use the information in comparing
alternative options and in weighing their risks and benefits in making a
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that the decision-maker's choice might diverge from the adult norm or from
what the researcher or others would regard as the correct choice, would be
irrelevant. These studies largely concluded that the cognitive abilities of at
least older adolescents were indistinguishable from those of adults, leading
the researchers to conclude that there was little, if any, reason to deny legal
weight to adolescent decisions where the same decision by an adult would
be respected. 90
An early example of this cognitive approach was a study conducted by
Thomas Grisso to determine a juvenile offender's capacity to waive
Mirandarights. 9' Grisso asked juveniles of different ages, as well as adults,
to paraphrase in their own words each of the Miranda warnings,92 to
define certain words in the standard warning, 93 and to explain what was

happening in a picture of a police interrogation.94 Sufficient comprehension
would presumably lead to a competent waiver decision; insufficient
comprehension would indicate lack of competence. 9
Grisso found that while the comprehension abilities of younger
teenagers were clearly inferior to those of adults, adolescents at least
sixteen-years-old were indistinguishable from adults in performing these
choice .... Tests of competence under the informed consent doctrine
focus on the process of decisionmaking and exclude emphasis on
outcome .... A strong norm supports the proposition that choices
about treatment should reflect the subjective values and preferences of
decision makers, and that no objective (external) measure of outcome is
appropriate.

Id. at 224.
90. See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel and Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in
Adolescent's PsychologicalandLegalCompetence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 129 (1992); Lois A. Weithom and Susan A. Campbell, The Competency of Children
to Make Informed Treatment Decisions,53 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1589 (1982); Catherine
C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over Grades Seven to Twelve
andPolicy Implications, 52 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 538 (1981).
91. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
92. Supra note 91 at 1144-46. "A response that indicated adequate understanding did
not require a sophisticated explanation as longas the basic meaningof the warningstatement
was conveyed." Id.
93. Id. at 1146-47 (using the words "consult," "attorney," "interrogation," "appoint,"
"entitled" and "right").
94. Id., at 1147-48.
95. Id. at 1143.
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tasks.96 Although Grisso advocated disallowing Miranda waivers by older
adolescents in light of the fact that even adults showed significant inability
to fully understand their rights,97 his research does challenge the notion that
older adolescents lack adult decision-making capacity.
A similar, cognitive, approach can be seen in a 1981 study by Catherine
Lewis, assessing adolescent decision-making in the context of health care. 98
Subjects who ranged in age from twelve to nineteen-years-old were
presented with a situation in which a peer was considering cosmetic
surgery. 99 The teenage subjects were then asked to advise this teenager.

The advice was scored to assess the degree to which the subject
demonstrated awareness of such things as the risks involved, the future
consequences of each choice, and whether advice from others would be
suspect due to a vested interest, such as a recommendation in favor of
surgery coming from a doctor who would profit from it."° Professor Lewis
found sharp differences in cognitive ability between seventh or eighth grade
students, on the one hand, and twelfth grade students, on the other."0 l While
this study did not include a comparison group of adults, it suggested that
older adolescents possess significant decision-making skills.
Lois Weithom and Susan Campbell compared the decision-making
capacity of adolescents and adults in the context of a hypothetical treatment
decision."0 2 Adolescents as young as sixteen were found to have the ability
to absorb information about treatment alternatives and their consequences
comparable to adults." 3 Weithom and Campbell cautioned that adolescent
performance might differ from that found in the laboratory setting when the
° but the cognitive
subject was faced with the stress of a real decision,'O
capabilities of adolescents still appeared significant.
Bruce Ambuel and Julian Rappaport conducted a study of adolescent
competence to choose abortion that was designed to answer criticism of
96. Id. at 1160.

97. Id. at 1164-66.
98. See Lewis, supra note 90.
99. Id. at 540. The operation was described as one to have "this ugly thing like a bump
on my cheek" removed, an operation that "won't make me healthier," but "would make me
look better."
100. Id. at 540-41.
101. Id. at 541-43.
102. Weithorn & Campbell, supranote 90.
103. Id. at 1595-96.
104. Id. at 1596.
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earlier studies based on the fact that those earlier studies either did not
sample adults as a comparison group, or tested adolescents who were
addressing a hypothetical rather than a real-life choice."0 5 Seventy-five
participants ranging in age from thirteen to twenty-one were recruited from
a women's medical clinic."° The participants, all of whom arrived at the
clinic seeking a pregnancy test, completed a questionnaire and participated
in an interview about their pregnancy and their choice for or against
abortion." 7

The questionnaire sought to determine the participant's level of factual
knowledge about pregnancy, childbirth, abortion and adoption' and their
general level of reading and reasoning skills.'0 9 The interview sought to
determine the extent to which the participant felt she was making the choice
of her own volition, whether she could explain the reasoning behind her
decision in a comprehensible way, and whether she considered both long
and short-term consequences."' The "richness" of her reasoning was
assessed based on her consideration of both material and psychological
consequences to herself, the unborn child, and third parties."'
Ambuel and Rappaport found no meaningful differences in the
competence of minors ages fifteen to eighteen as compared to the young
women aged eighteen to twenty-one." 2 This study, "in a real, socially and
emotionally complex setting,""' 3 concluded that "[b]y middle or later
adolescence, minors have the capacity to reason abstractly about
hypothetical situations, reason about multiple alternatives and consequences,
consider multiple variables, combine variables in more complex ways, and

105. Ambuel & Rappaport,supra note 90. The authors noted that previously there had
been no study that "directly compares the decision making of adolescent minors with a
criterion group of legal adults." Id. at 130.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 134-39.
108. Id. at 136. "Knowledge... was assessed by a 12-item true/false test of simple
factual information about abortion, adoption, parenthood and pregnancy." Id.
109. Id. at 137.
110. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 90, at 138.
111. Id. Relevant third parties would include such persons as the child's father, the
interviewee's parents, or the adoptive parents, should she choose adoption. Id. at 138, table
2.
112. Id. at 145-46.
113. Id. at 148.
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use information systematically in arriving at a decision."'" 4 In short, "minors
remain competent decision makers when facing an emotionally challenging,
'' 5
real-world decision."
The conclusions of these and similar studies were employed to advocate
legal respect for adolescent choices in cases such as Hodgson."6
However, to the extent that they support a generalized view recognizing the
maturity of at least older adolescents and their competence at decisionmaking, they also support a view that these adolescents bear full
responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. This would be
consistent with the movement in favor of full adult responsibility for juvenile
crime and would cast doubt on a decision such as Simmons, declaring the
age of the offender to present a constitutional ban to severe punishment.
B. More Recent Social Science
Not everyone in the fields of psychology or sociology was convinced by
the conclusions of these earlier studies. Even some who generally support
the legal rights of adolescents to make reproductive choices found the
evidence of equivalent adolescent and adult decision-making skill to be
weak." 7 In addition to pointing to things like small sample size, the failure
to test under "real world" conditions, or the failure to include adult
participants for comparison evident in some of the studies, these critics
wondered whether the significance of the studies' findings might have
subtly been influenced by the researchers' own views concerning the policy
implications of supporting or rejecting the contention that adolescents share
a level of decision-making skill with adults in the area of health care
choice." 8 These earlier studies, limiting themselves to evaluating the
114. Id. at 147.
115. Ambuel &Rappaport, supra note 90, at 148.
116. See supra,note 54.
117. See, e.g., William Gardner, David Scherer & Maya Tester, Asserting Scientific
Authority: CognitiveDevelopmentandAdolescentLegalRights,44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895

(1989). The authors begin with a discussion of the limits of psychology, or other science,
inlegal discourse. "A lawyer in an adversarial system of justice has an ethical duty to be an
effective partisan ... Responsible lawyers write to persuade. A responsible scientist,
however, will strive for disinterested prose, addressing all evidence and theory on a topic.
Arguments within briefs that claim scientific authority sharply focus this tension, as they
must satisfy the ethics governing both legal and scientific discourse." Id. at 895.
118. Id. at 897-99 "[I]t is vital to rigorously distinguish between egalitarian political
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cognitive skill behind a decision, placed little or no significance on the
ultimate outcome of the adolescent subject's choice. But some social
scientists were troubled by the fact that while exercising apparently similar

cognitive abilities, adolescents as a group might come to noticeably different
conclusions than adults in a number of contexts including the choice to
engage in criminal activity." 9 Pursuing an explanation for this discrepancy,
recent research has concluded that adolescents, as a group, differ in
significant ways from adults in their decision-making capabilities. Recent
findings, in quick summary, point to several significant differences. While
adolescents are able to recognize costs and benefits of alternative courses
of action, they attach different subjective values to these perceived
consequences than adults. 20 Adolescents place heavier weight on shortterm consequences than adults.' In addition, adolescents are more likely
to accept risk,'22 more likely to respond to aggressive impulses,'
likely to understand a situation from the perspective of others.

and less
To the

24

commitments and our epistemic attitudes... in scientific research." Id. at 899.
119. Elizabeth Scott and her colleagues point to the "strong norm [that] supports the
position that choices .. .should reflect the subjective values and preferences of decision
makers, and that no objective (external) measure of outcome is appropriate." Scott, supra
note 87, at 224. But, of course, the law, unlike pure science, is often in the business of
imposing external evaluation measures. See infra note 135. Certainly with respect to some
types of decisions, particularly those involving criminal activity, the incidence of youthful
decisions that are seen as antisocial will weigh in the evaluation of whether that decision is
held to be the product of competent choice, when that evaluation is made by a court. Thus,
debates over whether juveniles should be tried as adults "are usually triggered by a
particularly heinous crime," that is, the objective harm ofthe offense, Ira Schwartz, Juvenile
Crime FightingPolicies: What the PublicReally Wants, in Juvenile Justice and Public Policy
214, 221 (1992) (Ira Schwartz, ed.).
120. See generallyChristopher Slobogin et al., A PreventiveModelof Juvenile Justice:
The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 196-200.
121. See, e.g., Jari-Erik Normi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the
Development of Future Orientationand Planning,11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1 (1991).
122. See, e.g., Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992); LitaFurby & Ruth Beyth-Mason, Risk
Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1
(1992).

123. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity andJudgment
in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCL &
LAW, 741 (2000).

124. Id. at 751-54.
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extent that adolescents respond to the views of others, they are more
vulnerable than adults to peer pressure," 5 which makes it more likely that
outside influence will heighten, rather than diminish, these adolescent
biases.'26
Representative of these studies is the investigation by Elizabeth
Cauffinan and Laurence Steinberg into the maturity of adolescent
judgment. 27 Consistent with earlier studies, Cauffman and Steinberg note
that "maturity of judgment" relates to the process, rather than the outcome,
of decision-making.' 28 "The question is not whether robbing a liquor store
is a bad decision. The question is whether this decision arose from factors
that put adolescents, relative to adults, at an inherent disadvantage when
faced with choices in potentially antisocial situations."'29 Since the term
"decision-making" is so closely related to cognitive ability alone, the authors
prefer the term "judgment" to reflect a mixture of cognitive and
psychosocial abilities. 3 '
During Cauffman and Steinberg's research, over a thousand subjects
were sampled, including minors from eighth to twelfth grade, and college
students, both under and over age twenty-one.'' The subjects were
administered a set of widely accepted tests to assess personal responsibility
("feelings of internal control and the ability to make decisions without
extreme reliance on others"), 32 perspective (the ability to see both long and
short term consequences, and to take the perspective of other people into
account), 33 and temperance (impulse control and restraint of aggressive
behavior).

In

34

addition,

subjects

completed

the

Youth

Decision-Making

125. See, e.g., Peggy C. Giordano et al., Changes in FriendshipRelationsOver the Life
Course: Implicationfor DesistanceFrom Crim4 41 CRIMINOLOGY 293 (2003).
126. See, e.g., Terence D. Thomberry et. al., DelinquentPeers, Beliefs andDelinquent
Behavior: A Longitudinal Test of InteractionalTheory, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 47 (1994).
127. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 123.
128. Id.at 743.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 745.
131. Id.at 745-46.
132. Cauffinan & Steinberg, supra note 123, at 748. The Psychosocial Maturity
Inventory responsibility subscale measures feelings of self-reliance, self-esteem and pride
in one's work. Id. at 747-48.
133. Id. at 748.
134. Id. at 748-49.
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Questionnaire, a set of hypothetical situations requiring a choice between
an antisocial course of action and one approved by society.'3 5 In contexts
indicating negative consequences to self, no such consequences, or
uncertainty, subjects were asked to rate how likely they were to smoke
marijuana, shoplift, joy-ride in a stolen car, cheat on a test, or lie to an
employer.36
Some of Cauffman and Steinberg's findings are not surprising. For
example, subjects of all ages were more likely to engage in antisocial
behavior when no negative consequences to themselves would follow,137
and, in general, one's level of psychological maturity, as demonstrated by
levels of responsibility, perspective and temperance, was a better predictor
of the likelihood of antisocial behavior than age itself. 3 '
Nevertheless, despite the existence of "psychosocially mature 13-year
olds [who] demonstrate less antisocial decision-making than psychosocially
immature adults," 9 the authors conclude that "the average adolescent is
less responsible, more myopic, and less temperate than the average
adult."'40 The steepest increase in maturity of judgment seems to occur
between ages sixteen and nineteen, with little difference evident of further
development between nineteen and twenty-one. ' Late adolescence, then,
"marks an important transition point in psychosocial development that is
potentially relevant to debates about the drawing of legal boundaries
1 42
'
between adolescence and adulthood.'
The Cauffman and Steinberg study points to differences between adults
and adolescents in responsibility, perspective, and temperance. An earlier
study of juvenile offenders in London points to the likely effect of peers on
135. Id. at 749-50. While the norms of social science generally call for avoidingthe label
of "good" or "bad" with respect to choices, the authors here acknowledge that while "in
theory, the maturity of a decision is independent of its social acceptance.... [o]ur decision
to equate 'good' decision-making with socially accepted behavior is consistent with
everyday practice in the courts, and we have taken care to ensure that the 'right' and 'wrong'
choices in the scenarios used for this measure are not the sort that might be subjected to
reasonable debate." Cauffian & Steinberg, supra note 123, at 750.
136. Id. at 750.
137. Id. at 752.
138. Id. at 756.
139. Id. at 757.
140. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 123, at 757.
141. Id. at 756.
142. Id.
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adolescent decisions to engage in antisocial behavior.'43 Albert Reiss and
David Farrington collected data concerning the delinquency history of 411
boys from working class neighborhoods in London.' 44 The data was
examined as to the type of offense and whether the offender acted alone
or with others. 41 With the exception of crimes of violence, a clear pattern
emerged.' 6 Prior to age twenty, most offenses were committed with
others; after age twenty, a significant majority were committed alone, a
percentage that steadily grew to over 80% by the offender's late
twenties. 147 At least in the context of clearly antisocial decisions, this realworld study strongly suggests that peers have a greater influence on the
decision-making of acolescents.
By going beyond cognitive factors to include additional psychosocial
factors, this more recent wave of social science research has moved
toward a position more consistent with perhaps the stereotypical view of
non-specialists. That is, there are significant differences between the
decision-making capacity of adolescents and adults, and these differences
make adolescent decisions less flly responsible and less deserving of
respect.
C. Biological/AnatomicalStudies

The accuracy of social science findings is often criticized as being
influenced (consciously or unconsciously) by the researcher's own policy
preferences. 4 Thus, one might regard the early, cognition-based, social
science findings of adolescent competence as suspect insofar as this
research was conducted in the context of healthcare decisions (particularly
those concerning reproductive care), when the researchers' support of
adolescent decision-making rights might skew their findings.'49 Similarly, the
recent studies emphasizing differences between adolescents and adults has

143. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & David P. Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About CoOffending: Results From a ProspectiveLongitudinalSurvey ofLondon Males, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1991).
144. See id. at 368.
145. Id. at 369.
146. See id. at 370-72.
147. Id. at 370-76.
148. See generally Gardner et al, supra note 117.
149. See supra, notes 87 and 117.
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arisen in contexts when the most salient political issue affected is whether
juvenile offenders should be subject to full adult criminal penalties. 5 ° Again,
one might be skeptical of research conclusions that conveniently support the
researchers' own preferences for less draconian approaches to juvenile
justice.
The finding of biological studies would seem less open to such
skepticism, being presumably less vulnerable to criticisms concerning such
things as sample size, the value of self-reported views as opposed to real
world situations, and other problems that persist in social science research.
While social science work on the decision-making capacity of adolescents
dates back a few decades, 5 ' a line of inquiry based in biology and anatomy
has emerged only recently.
Before the development of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
anatomical studies of the brain depended on post-mortem examination. '
For obvious reasons, this limitation made it impossible to follow the
development of an individual brain over time. MRI technology, however,
allows researchers to follow such development. Recent longitudinal studies
lend significant weight to the later social science studies concluding that
adolescent and adult capacities are significantly different.' These studies
have observed "dramatic maturation" in the structure of the brains of the
average child and adolescent over time.M Specifically, these studies have
found that the regions of the brain, located in the frontal cortex, that are
associated with moral reasoning, risk assessment, and impulse control do not
filly develop until late adolescence.' 55 Accordingly, the typical adolescent
will depend more than the typical adult on the amygdala, the region of the
brain associated with triggering impulses such as anger, fear, and

150. See Melli, supra note 5.
151. See supra, notes 87-147 and accompanying text.
152. See M ICHAEL GAZZINIGA et al., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE:
THE MIND 63 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2nd ed. 2002).

THE BIOLOGY OF

153. See infra, notes 154-56.
154. ElizabethR. Sowell et al., Mapping CorticalChangeAcross the Human Life Span,
6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309 (2003). A number of recent brain studies were collected and

cited in the amicus brief of the American Medical Association et al. in Simmons at 9-20.
155. See Jay N. Giedd et al., BrainDevelopment DuringChildhoodand Adolescence:
A Longitudinal MR/ Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999); Thomas Paus et al.,
StructuralMotivation ofNeural Pathways in Children andAdolescents: In Vivo Study, 283
SCIENCE 1908 (1999).

HeinOnline -- 52 Wayne L. Rev. 27 2006

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

aggression. 15 6 These recent biological and anatomical studies combined with
the recent social science findings stressing psychosocial maturity in addition
to cognitive factors provide substantial support for the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Simmons that adolescent killers are less filly responsible for
their acts than adult killers and therefore, imposition of the death penalty on
such juvenile offenders is unconstitutional. But how far should this rationale
extend beyond the narrow confines of capital punishment? Does it require
adoption of a different penal approach to adolescent crime beyond the
prohibition of the death penalty? And, outside of the context of criminal
punishment, does it seriously undermine the basis for respecting adolescent
choice in reproductive and other healthcare matters? Finally, is a consistent
position on respect for adolescent decision-making necessary or are there
good reasons to tolerate the apparent tension between Simmons and cases
such as Hodgson?
IV. ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY AFTER SIMMONS

The social and biological research on adolescent decision-making
competence provides only part of the foundation for the Supreme Court's
decision in Simmons. As debate continues over the proper role of the Court
in assessing evolving community standards of acceptable punishment and
the relevance, if any, of international norms in interpreting rights under the
United States Constitution,157 adolescent decision-making abilities may
recede as a point of contention.
Still, although Simmons may have little effect beyond the narrow
confines of capital punishment law, the Court's recognition of the relevance
of adolescent decision-making capacity suggests that it cannot be
completely ignored in the consideration of future legal issues. These issues
can be divided into those, like Simmons, involving criminal law questions,
and those, like Hodgson, presenting issues relating to the recognition of
adolescent autonomy rights.

156. See L.P. Spear, TheAdolescent Brian andAge-Related Behavioral Manifestations,
& BIOBEHAVIORAL REvs. 417 (2000).
157. See supra, notes 27-38, and accompanying text. See A.E. Dick Howard, The
Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 383, 402-06 (1996) for a
discussion of the virtues and limitations of "borrowing" from other nations' constitutions.
24 NEUROSCIENCE
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A. Criminal Law Issues
Simmons raises obvious questions concerning the punishment of juvenile
offenders beyond the narrow confines of capital punishment. The Court's
recognition of limitations in decision-making capacity that mitigate the
responsibility of juvenile killers would appear equally relevant in cases
involving lesser crimes. Considering the Court's recognition of these
limitations, to what extent does this threaten the recent trend of states to

subject more juvenile offenders to the same procedures and punishments as
adults?'58
For centuries, criminologists and legal experts have debated the goals
of criminal punishment. To what extent should we punish in order to deter
others, to incapacitate the offender, or to seek retribution? 59 And what
place does rehabilitation have in the hierarchy of goals? A sophisticated
theory of retribution will recognize that retribution is something more than
mere vengeance. Instead, retribution is based on the notion that punishment
must be calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the offense, not merely in
terms of the effect of the act, but also the responsibility of the offender."6
And with the term so defined, retribution becomes an essential part of the
justification for punishment. But the principle not only justifies punishment,
it also limits it. We cannot punish to a degree excessive in light of the
offender's responsibility. For example, to knowingly punish someone who
is entirely innocent cannot be justified on the grounds that, by pretending he
is guilty, we can achieve significant effects in deterring others from
158. See Melli, supra note 5.
159. See generally ALAN W. NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT (1991);

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrude Ezorsky, ed., 1977); see also
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) ("[W]hat
is most needed is not the simple admission that instead of a single value or aim (Deterrence,
Retribution, Reform or any other) a plurality of different values and aims should be given
as a conjunctive answer to some single question concerningthe justification of punishment.
What is needed is the realization that different principles... are relevant at different points
in any morally acceptable account of punishment.").
160. See generally MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS,
LAW AND LITERATURE (Temple Univ. Press 1990); see also HERBERT PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 66 (Stanford Univ. Press 1968) ("It is wrong to say
that we should punish persons simply because they commit offenses under circumstances
that we can call blameworthy. It is right to say that we should not punish those who commit
offenses unless we can say that their conduct is blameworthy.").
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crime. 6 '
An understanding of retribution that requires punishment to be
calibrated to the level of responsibility of the actor, in addition to merely the
consequences of the punished act, clearly requires that the offender's
decision-making capacity be taken into account. But, Simmons, and the
social and biological science supporting it also require that we look at the
goal of rehabilitation. Support for rehabilitation as a goal of the penal system
has waxed and waned over the years. 162 At least with respect to adult
offenders, rehabilitative goals seem to have receded in recent decades, but
those goals have never fully been abandoned. So, the question remains: to
what extent, if any, is rehabilitation a necessary component of any system
of criminal punishment? Does the answer to this question vary when dealing
with different types of offenders? Are juveniles, as a group, entitled to
greater consideration of rehabilitation in sentencing than adult offenders?
One argument against capital punishment focuses on the fact that the
penalty has no rehabilitative component.'63 It implicitly denies the possibility
of the offender reforming sufficiently to rejoin the community. At least one
European court extended this rationale, holding that a life sentence with no
reasonable hope of parole violates fundamental principles of human
dignity."64 Of course, American courts have not gone so far. While the
161. See Hart,supranote 159, at 11-12. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality,
Subjectivity and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1985) ("A pure utilitarian
would argue that we should execute whomever, and however many, we need to in order to
deter the 'right' amount... [w]hether someone is guilty of a crime or deserves to die for it
is not of concern to the pure utilitarian. But no one in her right mind is apure utilitarian.").
162. The rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal is discussed in Randall McGowan, The
Well-OrderedPrison:England 1780-1865, in THE OXFORDHISTORYOF THE PRISON 79109 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995) and David J. Rothman, Perfectingthe
Prison: UnitedStates 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supraat 11129. See Steven Schlossman, Delinquent Children: The Juvenile Reform School in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, 363-69 for a discussion of the rehabilitative ideal in
juvenile corrections.
163. In religious terms, Christian abolitionists argue that "[c]apital punishment is
defeatist because it shows that society is prepared to make no allowance for a savingchange
of heart on the part of the people condemned." TOM SORRELL, MORAL THEORY AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 124 (Open Univ. 1988). See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, KILLING As
PUNISHMENT 160-62 (Northeastern Univ. Press 2004) for a somewhat similar argument,
without explicit religious overtones.
164. Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerg GE 187 (Federal Const. Court, Germany)
(1977), excerpted and translated in NORMAN DORSEN et. al, COMPARATIVE
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Supreme Court has not specifically held that rehabilitation is not an essential
element of criminal punishment, its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
65
particularly its capital punishment cases, clearly suggest as much.1
Deterrence and retribution may justify a punishment that, by its terms,
166
rejects the possibility of rehabilitation.
If we conclude that adolescents are still in a stage of development
regarding factors such as reasoning, risk-taking, and self control, then it
would seem to follow that they are, as a group, more likely to be
successfully rehabilitated. Rehabilitation has receded in importance among
the goals of criminal law for a number of reasons, 67 but one prominent
reason is a lack of faith in the efficacy of rehabilitation programs directed
at criminal offenders. 66 However, if there is reason to distinguish the
likelihood of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders from that of adult offenders,
a case can be made that a punishment regime that excludes a genuine
possibility of reform is insufficiently rational. 69 By no means does this
exclude even severe punishment of serious juvenile crime, but it does
suggest that punishment of juveniles, whatever its other justifications, must
include a stronger commitment to reform than might be necessary when
dealing with adults.
Of course, as a matter of constitutional law, Simmons may have little
if any effect beyond its narrow confines in limiting the punishment of
juvenile offenders. The Supreme Court has often recognized that under the
Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause, "death is different."'' 0
Limitations on government power to impose capital punishment will not
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 515-18 (2003).

165. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 ("Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law, but neither is it a forbidden objective") (citingWilliams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).

166. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207-26 (White, J., concurring).
167. See Rothman, supra note 162; see also Packer, supranote 160 at 57-58.
168. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
RegardingSentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252-57 (1979).
169. A conviction that juveniles were more amenable to rehabilitation was at the heart
of the movement for separate systems of juvenile justice and corrections. See Schlossman,
supranote 162; see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court,23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).

170. The phrase, first used in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, has been used so often as to give
rise to Justice Scalia's derisive comment that the Court, in limiting imposition of the death
penalty, has invented "a death-is-different jurisprudence." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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necessarily carry over to other, even severe, types of punishment. 7' Still,
the reasoning underlying Simmons supports not only courts, but legislatures
that might conclude that a less severely punitive approach to juvenile crime
is appropriate beyond merely taking the possibility of execution off the table.
B. The Impact of Simmons Outside of Criminal Law

Data supporting the conclusion that adolescent decision-making
capacity falls short of that of adults supports a juvenile justice system less
punitive and more committed to rehabilitation than the adult system. But
does the data also undermine arguments in favor of extending autonomy
rights to adolescents? The wide range of statutes and local ordinances that
limit adolescent activity more strictly than the general restrictions on adults
seem to demonstrate general public skepticism about the maturity of
adolescent decision-making, a skepticism reinforced by social and biological
science. 112 Courts have often upheld limitations on the freedom of minors
to act in ways that, were they applied to adults, would at least raise serious
constitutional problems.'73 But adolescent autonomy has been recognized
as entitled to constitutional protection in other contexts, most notably and
controversially, in cases involving reproductive rights and other types of
healthcare decisions.

74

Many who would applaud the invocation of the Simmons rationale to
limit the harshness of criminal law as applied to juveniles would object to the
use of the same rationale to limit adolescent autonomy in those non-criminal
contexts. To what extent should acceptance of Simmons compel the
171. Although the Eighth Amendment has been held to include a principle of
proportionality in punishment, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply it to
invalidate even the most severe noncapital sentences. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991) (upholding life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine); Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding sentence of 25 years to life under "three strikes"
law; third offense was theft of golf clubs).
172. See supra, notes 75-84, and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (permitting the state to
prohibit the sale to minors of material that does not meet the standard of 'obscenity' that
would justify prohibiting its sale to adults); Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988) (giving school authorities wide discretion to control content of student
publications); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding corporal punishment in
public schools does not violate due process or eighth amendment rights).
174. See supra,notes 8-10.
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rejection of claims of adolescent autonomy?
In response to this question, it is initially helpful to divide the broad range
of restrictions on the behavior of minors into two categories. The first and
largest category includes those restrictions that merely delay, rather than
ultimately deny, the choice to act in a certain way. These activities, which
are either forbidden to minors or permissible only with parental consent,
include things that are seen as relatively trivial, such as the decisions to
obtain a tattoo;' 75 decisions of enormous importance, such as the decision
to marry; 7 6 and many types of decisions in between. They key
characteristic of the restriction that places them in this category is not the
weightiness of the decision, but the fact that the restriction merely
postpones rather than completely deprives the adolescent of the decision.
If we have reason to believe that an adolescent's decision-making
capacity is still developing, and that the passage of time might either change
the adolescent's decision or, if not, satisfy us as to the maturity of the
decision, there exists a strong case for a legal restriction that postpones the
choice. To be sure, there is some cost here to the autonomy of a minor who
does possess a mature level of decision-making skill, but to postpone the
exercise of a right is less severe than to entirely deny it. Here, one may
draw a rough, although imperfect, analogy to the recent debates over the
right of an adult to exercise a "right to die," either by withdrawing medical
treatment or obtaining affirmative assistance in ending a terminal patient's
life. 177

Even most proponents of a legal right to assisted suicide concede that
in order to determine whether the request is a temporary desire or the
product of careful reflection, a reasonable time period is apropriate between
the patient's first request and the provision of such assistance.' 78 While
175. See supranote 82.
176. See supranote 77.
177. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (permitting
the state to apply "clear and convincing" test to evidence of patient's desire to withdraw
life-saving treatment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (allowing state to
prohibit assisted suicide).
178. See RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE RIGHT To DIE WITH DIGNITY 158-80
(2001), for a discussion of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act; see also William A.
Landman, A Proposalfor Legalizing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasiain South Africa, in 67
PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

203-223 (Loretta M. Kopelman & Kenneth A. DeVille eds., 2001) (stating that requests
should be well-considered with an opportunity to re-evaluate).
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there are obvious differences between this situation and that of the
adolescent, not least of which is that the time frame involved may be days
instead of years,'79 the basic idea remains the same. For this category of
decisions, where we have reason to suspect impairment of a decision-maker
in the exercise of judgment and where the passage of time will make us
more confident in the validity of the judgment, delaying the exercise of an
autonomy right is appropriate.
The second category of decisions presents a more difficult question.
Certain decisions simply cannot be postponed; a failure to decide is
effectively a decision. The decision to undergo an abortion or any other
pressing medical treatment must be made in the present, or the opportunity
to choose such a procedure is lost. Under these circumstances, we should
be more cautious in deciding whether adolescent autonomy is inappropriate.
One alternative, in cases where the stakes are high and the decision
cannot be postponed is to resort to a case-by-case inquiry into the maturity
of the individual adolescent. Individual assessment of decision-making
competency imposes significant costs on the judicial system; such an
approach is hardly worth the cost where the stakes are not high. One would
certainly not look forward to judges assessing the competence of countless
adolescent decisions to undergo body piercing. 8 ' When the question is
abortion, however, the cost of individual decision-making required by the
currently imposed judicial bypass options is far more justifiable.'' But as
Justice O'Connor points out in her Simmons dissent, the same is true in
cases involving the juvenile death penalty. 2 If assessing the maturity of the
adolescent choosing an abortion calls for case-by-case consideration, isn't
the pre-Simmons case-by-case analysis of the responsibility of the
adolescent offender sufficient to identify the rare cases where capital
punishment might be appropriate?
179. There is a fifteen-day waiting period under the Oregon Act between a terminalpatient's first oral request and the writingofthe prescription, see COHEN-ALMAGOR, supra

note 179, at 167.
180. SeeCONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 19a-92g (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-10.1

(2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.3 (2006) for examples of states that prohibit persons
under eighteen from body piercing without parental consent.
181. Elizabeth S.Scott, The Legal Constructionof Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
547 (2000), notes the inefficiency of "individualized assessments of maturity" as opposed
to categorical rules and observes that "[b]ecause such a strategy is costly and burdensome,
predictably it is only employed when the stakes are high." Id. at 561.
182. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 1212-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 52 Wayne L. Rev. 34 2006

2006]

ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE

35

A case-by-case inquiry into adolescent decision-making capacity is less
inconsistent with Simmons than a categorical rule accepting the maturity of
adolescent decision-making in the health care context, but it is nonetheless
inconsistent with categorical denial of that capacity. We will still need some
basis for supporting this inconsistency. Is it possible that different types of
choices might be more or less subject to the specific types of problems that
research has shown to be common in adolescent decision-making?
As a starting point, rather than simply working from a conclusion that
adolescent decision-making is deficient in some overall, global sense, we
can focus attention on the specific ways in which adolescent choice differs
from adult choice. As discussed above, studies indicate that adolescents are:
(a) prone to risk-taking behavior;.83 (b) likely to overvalue short-term results
as opposed to long-term consequences;'"t (c) more aggressive;' and (d)
more responsive to peer pressure than adults. 86 These differences can lead
adolescents, as a group, to make significantly different conclusions despite
the apparent equivalence of adolescent and adult cognitive skills.' 87
Although research on decision-making skills attempts to focus on the
process of decision-making and not on the outcome itself, it is hardly
realistic to assess decisions without some attention to the substance of the
choice. Indeed, we can assume that one of the key factors making
researchers skeptical of the early social science showing equivalent adult
and adolescent decision-making skills was the fact that the two groups
produced significantly different types of choices. And while a rigid scientific
reluctance to assign normative value to decisions-to label one type of
choice as good and another as bad-might have its advantages when social
183. See Arnett, supranote 122.
184. See Normi, supranote 121.
185. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 123.
186. See Giordano et al., supra note 125.
187. Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799,
816 (2003).
As the typical adolescent matures into adulthood, he becomes a more experienced
and competent decision maker; susceptibility to peer influence attenuates, risk
perception improves, risk averseness increases, time perception expands to focus
more on long-term consequences, and self-management improves. These
developments lead to changes in values and preferences. As adolescents become
adults, they are likely to make different choices from their youthful selves, choices
that reflect more mature judgment.
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science has an effect on social policy, it is unrealistic to avoid some
normative judgments. 'sI
For example, if social science found that a noticeable difference exists
between adolescent and adult decision-making, but that those differences
led adolescents to systematically favor choices seen as socially desirable,
the findings would be interesting but would obviously lead to an entirely
different type of debate about adolescent decision-making than when
choices are skewed in the opposite direction. If we want to avoid simple
labeling of choices as good or bad and the accusation of imposing our own
biases, we might defer to the community at large and label choices as prosocial, antisocial, or either neutral or contested. Do the biases present in
adolescent decision-making lead to a greater likelihood of antisocial choice
than choices that are pro-social or unclear?
Apart from a few eccentric views, it is safe to assume that a consensus
exists that the decision to commit a crime, at least a serious crime, is an
antisocial choice. Most would agree that such a choice is also, on balance,
harmful to any adolescent making such a choice. But far less consensus
exists with respect to adolescent healthcare decisions. While many would
regard an adolescent decision to obtain an abortion as harmful to society as
well as to the adolescent,189 many others would regard the decision as
neutral at worst and perhaps even beneficial to both society and the
adolescent, when compared to the alternative of teenage motherhood.'"
Similar disagreement exists on the question of adolescent access to
contraceptives. Some see this as an incentive to engage in irresponsible
teenage sexual activity, which poses obvious risks to the welfare of the
community and the individuals involved. 91 Others see such access as
necessary to minimize harmful consequences of inevitable teenage sexual
experimentation.'92 When we consider health care decisions outside the
188. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 123.
189. See, e.g., several of the essays in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION
(David Mall & Walter F. Watts, eds. 1979).
190. "The physical and emotional and economic burdens of pregnancy are intense, but
so are the parallel burdens of parenthood." RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 111
(1993).
191. This is largely the rationale behind federal financial support for "abstinence only"
education in public schools. See Elizabeth Arndorfer, Absent Abstinence Accountability, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585 (2000).
192. See, e.g., James McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective,
Unpopular and Unconstitutional,38 U.S.F.L. REV. 665 (2004).
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context of reproduction, such as a decision to refuse aggressive or invasive
medical procedures, it is perhaps even less clear that a decision either way
is antisocial. In many cases, no consensus will exist on which choice is
beneficial to the individual. In terms of their effect on society and the
individual, all of these health care decisions stand in contrast to the decision
to commit a crime, at least to the extent of presenting no clear consensus.
With this as background, we can now examine the likely impact of the
specific ways in which adolescent decision-making appears deficient with
respect to different types of adolescent decision making.'93 The choice to
engage in serious criminal behavior will almost always appear riskier than
a decision to obey the law. In this context, the adolescent bias works in the
direction of clearly antisocial behavior and behavior that also places the
individual in danger of harmful consequences. With respect to the abortion
decision, the situation is less clear. While the decision to undergo an abortion
is certainly not risk-free, either physically or emotionally, the decision give
birth and assume the role of teenage mother presents its own serious risks.
In this case, the bias toward risk should not systematically favor one
decision over the other.
The same lack of clarity appears when we consider the issue of
contraceptive access. On one hand, it is logical to assume that the
availability of contraceptives might combine with the adolescent bias toward
risk to push teenagers in the direction of increased sexual activity. But for
teenagers who have decided to experiment, the choice to use contraceptives
reduces risk. Since the choice to obtain and use contraceptives can be
viewed as either increasing or reducing risk, it is unclear whether that
choice is skewed in either direction by the adolescent bias toward risk.
The apparent adolescent bias in favor of aggression' 94 presents the
same contrast when examined in different decision-making contexts.
Certainly, violent crime and certain non-violent crimes are acts of
aggression. Few, if any, health care decisions can be classified as
aggression. While opponents of abortion might classify this procedure as an
act of aggression against the fetus, the similarity to violent crime seems
more rhetorical than actual. And other health care decisions carry no hint
of aggression toward others. Once again, the adolescent decision-making
bias clearly favors an antisocial direction when the decision involves a
criminal act, but not in the context of health care.
193. See Arnett, supra note 122.
194. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 123.
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A similar pattern is evident when considering the adolescent bias in
favor of short term, rather than long-term, consequences.' 9 A decision to
commit a crime clearly presents a choice of perceived short-term gain over
potential long-term punishment. A bias toward short-term consequences
leads, in a consistent way, toward the option that is both antisocial and
dangerous to the long-term welfare of the adolescent. A decision with
respect to reproduction or other health care issues presents a much more
ambiguous picture. When faced with pregnancy, an adolescent may
overvalue either the perceived short-term gains of having a child or of
having an abortion.'96 Each decision will lead to long-term consequences
that one should not disregard or underappreciate, but it would not seem that
the bias toward short-term thinking systematically leads in one direction or
the other.
The balance between short and long-term consequences of a decision
to obtain contraceptives will vary depending on where we begin our inquiry.
If we begin with the decision whether or not to engage in teenage sexual
activity, then we might logically conclude that the availability of
contraceptives makes the short term benefits even more attractive. But if
we begin from the perspective of an adolescent who has already decided
to engage in sexual activity, the availability of contraceptives would seem
at most a neutral factor in determining the frequency of such activity.
Indeed, for such an adolescent, the decision to obtain and use
contraceptives would appear to be a decision made in spite of, rather than
as a consequence of, the adolescent bias in favor of short-term benefits.
Finally, we must consider the effect of peer pressure. 97 Peer pressure
is only significant when it acts in conflict with parental or general social
norms. Adolescent peers may simply reinforce other norms in certain
contexts or in certain communities. But in such cases, peer pressure is not
what we generally take the term to mean. Instead, we are concerned about
195. See Normi, supranote 121.
196. Since there are no significant legal or political battles raging over the choice of
pregnant adolescents to forego abortion and give birth, it can easily be overlooked that such
a decision, with all of its consequences, is also being made by an adolescent subject to the
same age-based limitations on mature decision-making as those who choose abortion. See
Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 90, where the researchers divided their subjects into
groups who considered or did not consider abortion as an option. Above age fifteen, there
were no differences found in volition or cognitive competence between the two groups. Id.
at 145.
197. See Giordano et al., supra note 125.
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the likelihood that the values of the peer group will clash with other
influences.
Perhaps isolated exceptions might exist, but for the most part we can
assume that parental and community norms oppose juvenile criminal
behavior. Thus, peer pressure, when it acts as a counterweight to societal
pressure, consistently nudges the adolescent in an antisocial direction. To
put it another way, since parental and community influence will essentially
always run in a pro-social, anti-crime direction, peer pressure to violate
community norms will also essentially always run in one direction as
well--one we will always see as harmful.
In the area of health care, particularly abortion and contraception, the
picture is less clear. Parents, as well as adolescent peer groups, will have
varying views on whether their adolescent daughters should seek an
abortion.'98 Where the views of the peer group conflict with parental or
community views, they may conflict in urging for or against abortion, and
different communities may see either position, as pro-social, antisocial, or
essentially neutral. And while we might well assume that general parental
and social norms oppose teenage sexual activity and that significant peer
pressure pushes adolescents toward such activity, we cannot say the same
about the question of contraceptive use by sexually active teenagers. Thus,
once we define peer pressure as limited to that which acts in opposition to
parental and community norms, we can see a significant difference between
the potential effect of peer pressure in the decision of the adolescent to
engage in crime and the adolescent decision regarding abortion or
contraception. While peer pressure might be a significant factor in each
instance, when it affects the adolescent criminal, it acts in a way that we
can label as antisocial with little fear of disagreement. Since parental and
community norms will differ on questions of abortion and contraception,
peer pressure acting to counter those norms in an individual case cannot be
classified as antisocial with any degree of confidence.
This is even more clear in the context of health care decisions outside
of the reproductive context. Where the decision confronting an adolescent
is whether to undergo arguably necessary treatment or to withdraw current
treatment, it would not seem that the adolescent biases toward risk-taking,
198. Many adolescents inform at least one parent of an impending abortion regardless
of the existence or nonexistence of a parental notification statute. See Robert W. Blum et al.,
The Impact ofa ParentalNotificationLaw on Adolescent Decision-Making,77 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 619 (1987).
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aggression, short term thinking, or responsiveness to peer pressure would
point consistently in one direction. And even more so than in the case of
reproductive decisions, there is no clear answer to the question of which
type of choice is harmful to either the community or the adolescent.
None of this necessarily establishes a solid basis for respecting
adolescent decision-making outside of the context of criminal law, while
simultaneously regarding adolescents as less then fully responsible for their
criminal acts. It does, however, suggest that the apparent dissonance
between the treatment of adolescent decision-making in Simmons and its
treatment in other contexts is explained by the differences between
adolescent and adult decision-making and the likely impact in various
contexts.
Deciding to treat adolescent decision-making differently in different
contexts does not necessarily mean that such treatment must be radically
different. Note that Hodgson and other health care cases do not simply
give adolescents the full equivalent of adult decision-making authority, rather
they establish a method for determining maturity in individual cases. 199
Justice O'Connor's contention in her Simmons dissent,2" that individual
consideration of adolescent responsibility is called for in either a criminal or
a health care context, cannot be dismissed in light of the fact that social
science is capable only of speaking in terms of averages and probabilities
rather than in absolute terms. But if the social and biological data, seen
against the background of different decision-making contexts, do show
significant differences, then perhaps the dissonance between a categorical
rule in one case and a rule of case-by-case balancng in another is the
optimal solution.
Respecting an adolescent decision on reproductive or other health care
matters will not necessarily be harmful to either the community or the
adolescent. Imposing full adult responsibility on an adolescent for his
criminal choices, whatever the effect on the community, will certainly harm
the adolescent. This illustrates another possible justification for maintaining
apparently conflicting standards. Simmons and the health care cases are
reconcilable on the grounds that the law will be more skeptical of adolescent
decision-making where it is clear that the decision is detrimental to the longterm interests of the adolescent.
Such an adolescent-protective approach might seem paternalistic, but
199. See supra, notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
200. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 1214-15.
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it is less paternalistic than denying respect to all adolescent decision-making.
And the law by no means rejects all paternalism; as described earlier, a
wide range of adolescent choices are invalidated in matters where the
stakes are much lower than those presented by the cases considered
here. 20 1 Few, if any, of the juvenile offenders whose punishments are
mitigated under a Simmons rationale would likely object, and unless change
of paternalism comes from those who would grant adolescents broad
decision-making authority in a wide range of matters, it loses much of its
force.
V. CONCLUSION
Does Simmons, with its recognition of a diminished level of criminal
responsibility of adolescent offenders, require reconsideration of the extent
to which law should or must respect adolescent choices outside of the
criminal context? Conversely, must those who reject Simmons, to maintain
consistency, support legal respect for adolescent choice in contexts such as
reproductive or other health care decisions?
Simmons, of course, may have little or no effect outside the confines of
capital punishment law. It may be merely another example of a Court
unwilling or unable to declare capital punishment unconstitutional, but
sufficiently uncomfortable with it to chip away at the most questionable
instances of its application. 22 The Supreme Court has placed impediments
to execution without necessarily extending the logic behind them to other
contexts, at least not without much further thought.0 3
201. See supra,notes 75-84 and accompanying text. Elizabeth Scott contends that the
statutes that permit adolescents to make certain health care decisions are based not so much
on assessments of juvenile decision-making competence, but "on the harm of requiring
parental consent," in "situations in which the traditional assumption - that parents can be
counted on to respond to their children's medical needs in a way that promotes the child's
interest - simply might not hold." Scott, supra note 182, at 568.
202. See supra,notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
203. The Supreme court held that appointed counsel was required for indigent
defendants in capital cases decades before its decision that there was such a requirement in
all state felony cases. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requiring counsel in
capital cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring counsel in all state
felony cases). The Supreme Court has recently shown a willingness to seriously evaluate
ineffective counsel claims in capital cases. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005);
Florida v. Nixon, 125 St. Ct. 551 (2005).
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Still, the question of consistency in the legal treatment of adolescent
choice remains. It may, however, be possible to resolve the question in an
intellectually honest manner without adopting an all-or-nothing approach.
While recent social and biological science demonstrates some significant
differences in adolescent and adult decision-making, the specific differences
would seem to have more relevance to the decision to engage in criminal
activity than to exercise choices in other contexts. Most statutes and
ordinances that limit adolescent choice do so in ways that can be seen as
merely delaying, rather than prohibiting, the choice to engage in certain
activity. With respect to that narrow category of significant life decisions
that cannot be postponed, a legal regime that conducts a preliminary
investigation into the maturity of the individual minor prior to granting the
right provides a middle ground between categorical acceptance or rejection
of a right of adolescent autonomy.
If we accept, despite charges of paternalism, the legitimacy of the law's
attempt to protect adolescents from excessive harm from their own
decisions, perhaps a rigid consistency is unwarranted. A limited respect for
certain types of adolescent decisions might comfortably co-exist with limits
on other types and a mitigation of the most serious negative consequences
of the decision to engage in juvenile crime.
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